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ABSTRACT 
 
With the September 2006 release of Statement No. 158, “Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit 
Pension and Other Postretirement Plans,” the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has 
completed the first phase of its ongoing pension accounting project.  The new standard improves the 
accounting for defined benefit pensions by requiring employers to report the over(under)funded 
status of their plans as an asset(liability) within the main body of their balance sheet. This 
requirement represents a significant change from previously-existing pension accounting standards, 
and represents a major step forward toward the goal of increased transparency in financial 
reporting.  This article provides a discussion of the very lengthy and controversial history of 
employer pension accounting, and examines the improvements that have finally resulted from 
Statement No. 158. Also provided is a discussion of the potential outcome of the second and final 
phase of the FASB’s pension accounting project 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
ccounting standards for defined benefit pension plans have long been a source of controversy for the 
accounting profession.  The ideal method of accounting for these pension plans should provide information 
that is easy for the user to understand and for the preparer to provide.  And, of course, the ideal method of 
accounting for these plans would be based on the most accurate valuations of the pension plan‘s assets and liabilities.  In 
most cases, the most accurate valuation of pension assets would be based on readily available stock market valuations.  
The most accurate valuation of the pension liabilities would be based on the best estimate provided by the firms‘ actuaries.  
This ideal method of accounting for defined benefit pension plans would be intuitive, easy to understand, and relatively 
easy to provide.  Furthermore, the provisions of such a standard would require nothing more than an adherence to the basic 
tenets of accounting theory as espoused in the Financial Accounting Standards Board‘s Conceptual Statements.  However, 
the profession has not used this ideal method of accounting for defined benefit pensions even though variants of it were 
first proposed nearly 60 years ago. 
 
Interestingly, the reasons for the profession to forgo the use of this ideal method of pension accounting had 
nothing to do with any of the constructs that are supposed to drive the promulgation of our accounting standards.  Instead, 
the deficiencies in this area of accounting are primarily based on two factors: historical precedence and fear of negative 
economic consequences.  According to the profession‘s foundational guidance, as found in the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board‘s Conceptual Statements, neither of these aforementioned factors should have played any role in the 
creation of pension accounting standards.  Interestingly, and instructively, these factors did play a significant role. 
 
The aforementioned reference to historical precedence refers to the fact that pension accounting was initially 
based on a ―pay as you go‖ method where pension expense was generally not recognized until actual payment was made to 
a firm‘s retirees.  The reference to negative economic consequences refers to how the profession feared the negative 
economic impact that would result from a full recognition of accrued expenses and associated liabilities.  Since these large 
values had not previously been reported, such a move would have caused significant decreases in reported owners‘ equity 
of most of the affected firms. 
A 
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Given this combination of historical roots in ―pay as you go‖ accounting and the feared economic impact of a 
change to full accrual accounting, it is easy to understand why the profession was hesitant to mandate a sudden move to 
fully accrued measures of pension expense and liability.  However, such an intuitive understanding of the resulting 
impasse requires an admission that the promulgation of accounting standards can indeed be affected by factors not found 
in the profession‘s professed constructs, as defined in the Concept Statements.  Trying to understand the evolution of 
pension standards without this admission is extraordinarily difficult because it would overlook the primary factors that 
made the history of pension standards unfold as it did.  Overlooking these factors makes the history appear to be disjoint, 
inconsistent, and illogical.  But perhaps most importantly, such a failure to consider these external forces would rob the 
profession of a unique opportunity to learn from its own history.  
 
The significance of this topic is twofold.  First, the controversial nature of the evolution of pension standards 
provides a uniquely rich opportunity to reflect upon the nature of the accounting standard setting process.  Second, the 
process could possibly be reaching its culmination.  The FASB appears to be openly admitting the shortfalls in this 
important area of accounting and is currently enacting a multi-phase approach that could possibly yield the intuitively 
understandable and theoretically correct solution that is so long overdue.  Truthfully reflecting upon the reasons for the 
prior impasses will help ensure that this current attempt to solve the problem will more likely achieve its justly deserved 
successful outcome.  To help facilitate this process, this paper discusses the history of accounting for defined benefit 
pensions, the intuitive reasons for the profession‘s lengthy impasse in the development of these standards, the perceived 
deficiencies of the standards in the recent past, and the major requirements and improvements that will result from the 
FASB‘s recent standard on this topic. 
 
HISTORY OF DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION ACCOUNTING 
 
The Committee On Accounting Procedures 
 
The first notable event in the standard setting history of defined benefit pension plans dates back to 1948 when 
the Committee on Accounting Procedure issued Accounting Research Bulletin (ARB) No. 36 ―Pension Plans: Accounting 
for Annuity Costs Based on Past Services.‖  At the time of the enactment of ARB 36, pension accounting was typically 
based on a cash basis approach, which meant that pension expense was primarily a function of payments made to the then-
current retirees.  The Committee on Accounting Procedure correctly observed that this method of accounting failed to 
properly accrue pension expense and thus focused their attention on resolving this deficiency.  The conclusion of their 
efforts culminated in the issuance of ARB 36.  ARB No. 36 recommended that firms allocate their unfunded accumulated 
benefits over current and future periods in order to better match the ―startup‖ costs of pension plans to the revenues 
resulting from their employees‘ labor.  Interestingly, the basic premises contained in this initial standard are consistent with 
the goals currently espoused by the FASB.  The primary shortcoming of this initial standard was due to the nature of 
accounting standard setting at that time, not to any inherent flaw in the standard itself.  At that time, the provisions of 
Accounting Research Bulletins did not have the authoritative backing that is enjoyed by current standards.  The provisions 
of Bulletins were only recommended accounting, meant to persuade and guide accountants.  So while ARB 36 generally 
proposed the conceptually correct ideal of accruing pension expense to better match it with the associated revenues, its 
lack of authority predictably affected its ability to resolve the pension accounting dilemma. 
 
Nearly ten years lapsed before the Committee on Accounting Procedure revisited this topic in 1956.  The 
Committee‘s deliberations during that year resulted in the issuance of ARB 47, ―Accounting for Costs of Pension Plans‖.  
While ARB 36 recommended the accrual of pension expense to provide for better matching, ARB 47 built upon this 
recommendation by also calling for the recognition of unfunded vested benefits as liabilities on the balance sheet.  Thus 
while ARB 36 primarily focused on the income statement, ARB 47 primarily focused on the balance sheet.  The 
combination of these statements provided recommendations that were again consistent with the ideals that are presently 
motivating the FASB.  These ideals include the need for the full accrual of pension expense and the full recognition of net 
pension liabilities. 
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The Increase In Authority: The Transition From Recommended Accounting To Required Accounting. 
 
In 1959 the Committee on Accounting Procedures was replaced by the Accounting Principles Board (APB).  
One of the major differences between the two organizations was the resulting authority of their pronouncements.  
Accounting Research Bulletins were considered recommended accounting.  Conversely, APB Opinions were considered 
required accounting, and accordingly, had more of an impact on actual accounting practice.  The lack of effectiveness of 
the Committee‘s previous Bulletins could be evidenced by the fact that until the passage of the APB‘s Opinion No. 8, 
nearly all companies continued to use the cash basis to account for their pensions.  Apparently, the suggested accounting 
contained within Bulletins 36 and 47 had little effect on actual accounting practice.  The ineffectiveness of proposed 
accounting standards was one of the main issues that were addressed during the wave of changes that accompanied the 
creation of the APB.  In order to strengthen the authority of the accounting profession‘s standards, the AICPA and the 
APB declared that all material departures from Committee Bulletins and APB Opinions had to be disclosed and explained 
in the companies‘ published financial statements.  The perceived burden of proof and related legal risk that accompanied 
future departures from these standards effectively brought about the authority that was sought.  
 
Ironically, it could be argued that the profession‘s ability to enact conceptually correct pension standards was 
negatively correlated to the standards‘ resulting authority.  When the authority of the standards was weak, as was the case 
during the reign of the Committee on Accounting Procedures (1939-1959), it was easy to overlook the economic and 
political consequences of the standard setting process, and to thus enact standards that were driven solely by their 
conceptual merits.  However, when the authority of accounting standards became stronger, as happened subsequent to the 
creation of the Accounting Principles Board (APB), it became more difficult to overlook the resulting economic and 
political consequences of the standard setting process.  Accordingly, a more thoughtful consideration of the full 
consequences of this increased authority makes it easier to understand how the resulting pension standards of the APB 
became less grounded in theory alone.  Stated differently, when standards were mere recommendations, they could be 
driven entirely by theory and without regard to their economic consequences.  However, when standards became 
mandates, adherence to theoretical constructs without due consideration of the economic consequences would have been 
short-sighted and counterproductive.  Thus, the creation of standards by the APB that called for less than full accrual of 
expenses and less than full recognition of liabilities was more predictable, than it was surprising.  It is sheer foolishness to 
presume that the accounting standard setting process is never affected by perceived economic and political consequences.  
To say that it is not affected by these consequences is to imply that the profession is indifferent to its societal impact.  That 
is neither the actuality nor the ideal.  However, the typical hesitancy to make this admission in a classroom setting makes it 
needlessly difficult to explain the evolution of, or desired conclusions of, many contemplated accounting standards.  This 
is particularly true of pension accounting standards.  The consideration of economic and political effects on the standard 
setting process provides the perspective that makes the evolution downright logical.  Conversely, without this 
consideration, the theoretical inconsistencies of the evolutionary process make an understanding of it incomprehensible. 
 
The Accounting Principles Board Era 
 
The Accounting Principles Board was created in 1959 in order to provide increased uniformity and consistency 
in various areas of financial reporting, including that of pension reporting.  The APB‘s primary contribution to pension 
accounting came in 1966 when they issued APB Opinion No. 8, ―Accounting for the Costs of Pension Plans.‖  If the APB 
had been motivated to promulgate the most theoretically correct standard possible, they would have called for the full 
accrual of pension expense and the full recognition of the associated net pension liability.  It turned out that APB Opinion 
No. 8 called for far less than the full accrual of pension expense and for far less than the full recognition of net pension 
liability.  However, its ―failure‖ to do so does not necessarily mean that the APB was acting in a manner that betrayed their 
societal obligations.  In fact, it can be easily argued that an immediate move to full accrual and recognition would have 
been short-sighted and, consequently, detrimental to the interests of society.  By attempting to ease and smooth the 
transition, as the APB did in Opinion 8, the APB could be seen as providing an intelligent response that balanced the need 
for improved accounting against the potential for economic harm from moving too fast.  With the luxury of hindsight, the 
need for improved accounting at that time is all too apparent.  However, the potential consequences resulting from making 
those changes too quickly are less obvious. The accumulated pension deferrals of many decades resulted in unrecognized 
liabilities that exceeded the net worth of many companies.  Thus, the immediate recognition of these previously 
unrecognized liabilities could easily have caused economic consequences severe enough to justify, or even mandate, a 
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cautious approach.  So while a static analysis of Opinion No. 8 would likely result in criticism for its all too obvious failure 
to fully accrue pension expense or to recognize the full amount of net pension liability, a more dynamic long term analysis 
reveals that the provisions of APB 8 fulfilled a predictable and logical need at that time for an incremental step in what was 
intended to be an evolutionary process. 
 
Accordingly, the primary focus of Opinion No. 8 was on the measurement of periodic pension expense.  This 
focus on expense, rather than liability valuation, allowed the APB to mandate a better valuation of current pension expense 
(normal cost), while gently nudging the profession to address prior period deferrals.  The minimum treatment mandated by 
the APB was the recognition of interest expense on the accrued deferrals.  This treatment served as a cap on previously 
accumulated deferrals by ensuring these deferred costs would not grow in size due to the mere passage of time.  The 
maximum treatment mandated by the APB required the firms to amortize these accumulated deferrals, which of course 
would serve to decrease them over time. 
 
APB Opinion No. 8 was important because it provided a clear break with the past practice of basing pension 
expense solely on cash contributions to the then-current retirees.  The ultimate determination of pension expense was 
based on any of a number of acceptable actuarial cost methods.  However, as was previously mentioned, a reasoned 
decision was made by the APB to not require the full recognition of the net pension liability.  Since the majority of these 
liabilities resulted from the events of prior periods, the APB sought only to encourage the gradual recognition of them 
through a possible process of amortization. 
 
The main provision of Opinion No. 8 was to provide a range of acceptable expense recognition with the 
maximum equal to normal cost plus amortization of 10 percent of prior service costs and the minimum equal to normal 
cost plus interest on prior service cost. Any actuarial method that was consistently used was deemed appropriate as long as 
the resulting expense was within the aforementioned range.  The logic of this treatment of prior period gains or losses can 
only be fully understood when it is viewed dynamically as an incremental step within an evolutionary process.  
Accordingly, accounting students, who typically don‘t view things in either a long-term or dynamic fashion, must have 
been surprised by statements such the following found in the then-current edition of Kieso and Weygandt‘s Intermediate 
Accounting: 
 
The pension liability that frequently appears on company balance sheets represents an accounting credit that results from 
an excess of amounts expensed over amounts contributed to the pension fund; it does not represent the economic 
obligations under the plan and usually does not represent amounts legally owed to the pension plan. [page 922, Kieso and 
Weygandt, Intermediate Accounting, 1980] 
 
Predictably, APB Opinion No. 8 was soon criticized for its shortcomings.  However, it remained as the 
authoritative pension standard for the next 19 years. The most important aspect of Opinion No. 8 was its requirement that 
normal cost be recognized as a component of pension expense for current and future periods, thus ending the previously 
predominant practice of equating pension expense with cash payments to a company‘s then current retirees.  However, 
since the minimum pension expense required by Opinion 8 effectively allowed prior service cost to largely remain off the 
books, it was remarkable that a standard with such laxity and minimal impact on practice would last as long as it did.  On 
one hand, the creation of a compromised standard at that time was predictable and arguably wise.  On the other hand, its 
longevity was surprising and arguably unwise. 
 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board Era 
 
The primary FASB standard for defined benefit pensions has long been Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard No. 87 ―Employers‘ Accounting for Pensions‖ which was issued in December, 1985.  While there were several 
other FASB standards issued for pensions, only No. 87 dealt with the fundamental measurement issues affecting the 
amounts of reported pension expense and net liability.  The other myriad statements were largely confined to the topic of 
footnote disclosure. 
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SFAS No. 87 was important in that it brought about a greater standardization of methods used for measuring 
current pension expense.  APB No. 8 allowed the use of any consistently-used actuarial method as long as the resulting 
expense fell within the APB‘s allowable range.  With SFAS No. 87, the FASB provided specific guidance on the methods 
to be used to determine pension expense.  This newly enacted guidance included the mandatory amortization of prior 
service cost, a more uniform method of determining how previously deferred actuarial costs would be amortized, and a 
requirement to recognize a minimum pension liability – albeit under certain highly compromised conditions.  Thus, the 
primary benefit of SFAS No. 87 was that it tightened up the compromises that existed in APB No. 8.  The primary 
deficiency of SFAS No. 87 was that the progress resulting from this enhanced standardization was arguably too meager 
given the passage of 20 years since the implementation of APB No. 8.  However, FASB clearly knew that SFAS No. 87 
would not represent the ultimate solution to the pension dilemma.  They therefore felt comfortable with the issuance of a 
standard that represented little more than another step in their anticipated evolutionary process.  They emphasized the 
incremental nature of the statement by offering the following observation: 
 
This statement continues the evolutionary search for more meaningful and more useful pension accounting.  The FASB 
believes that the conclusions it has reached are a worthwhile and significant step in that direction, but it also believes that 
those conclusions are not likely to be the final step in the evolution.  Pension accounting in 1985 is still in a transitional 
stage.  (para no. 5 of SFAS No. 87) 
 
While SFAS No. 87 represented an improvement over APB No. 8, its many compromises mandated the need for 
additional progress in the future.  The fact that it remains as the preeminent standard for pension accounting to this day 
provides valuable evidence of the strength that external forces can have on the profession‘s standard setting process.  The 
many FASB standards that followed SFAS No. 87 failed to make any additional changes in the measurement of pension 
expense.  Instead, the pension-related pronouncements that were issued in the 21 year span subsequent to the issuance of 
SFAS No. 87 were all constrained to issues of disclosure. 
 
It is interesting, predictable, and perhaps disappointing, to observe that the accounting profession reacted to the 
shortcomings of both APB No. 8 and SFAS No. 87 through the issuance of standards calling for additional footnote 
disclosure.  APB Opinion No. 8 (enacted in 1966) was followed by the disclosure-only Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 36, ―Disclosure of Pension Information‖ in 1980.  SFAS No. 87 (enacted in 1985) was similarly followed 
by disclosure-only statements.  These post 87 disclosure-only statements included Statement No. 112 issued in 1992, 
Statement No. 132 issued in 1998, and the revised Statement No. 132 issued in 2003.  While the resulting disclosures from 
these statements might have improved the pension-related information available to financial statement users, it was 
probably long forgotten that FASB itself had proclaimed that such an approach would never suffice.  In Statement 87 
(paragraph 116) the FASB included the following interesting observation on this matter: 
 
...footnote disclosure is not an adequate substitute for recognition.  The argument that the information is equally useful 
regardless of how it is presented could be applied to any financial statement element, but the usefulness and integrity of 
financial statements are impaired by each omission of an element that qualifies for recognition.  Further, although the 
“equal usefulness” argument may be valid for some sophisticated users, the Board does not believe it holds for all or even 
most other users. 
 
In the end, the requirements of Statement No. 87, like those of Opinion No. 8, represented a compromised 
approach that could only be applauded if they served as nothing more than an additional incremental step within a 
responsibly-paced evolutionary process.  On the positive side, SFAS No. 87 reigned in the number of options available to 
financial statement preparers; provided for a more uniform method of determining the amount, if any, of the prior 
unrecognized gains and losses that would be recognized; required the amortization of prior service costs; and provided for 
at least some limited consideration of the unfunded obligation as a possible component of pension liability.  On the 
negative side, its compromised provisions yielded a standard that fell far short of the idealized goals of fully accrued 
expenses on the income statement and accurately valued liabilities on the balance sheet.  If Statement 87 was soon after 
replaced by another statement which pushed the process further along, SFAS 87 could have been viewed as a laudable and 
valuable step in an evolutionary process.  In retrospect, it was the lack of action after 87‘s implementation that constitutes 
its primary condemnation.  The amount of progress in the provisions of 87 was too small to justify a twenty-one year delay 
in taking the next substantive step. 
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Perhaps Mr. Arthur Wyatt foresaw the likelihood of this outcome when he expressed concerns about the lack of 
progress represented by SFAS No. 87.  Mr. Wyatt, a member of the FASB at that time, noted his dissatisfaction by stating 
his belief that ―…this Statement falls short of achieving the degree of improvement in accounting for pension costs that 
was attainable and that users of financial statements could justifiably expect from this project.‖ (page 27, SFAS No. 87).  
He underscored his concern by providing the following dissenting comment in the conclusions of SFAS No. 87: 
 
Mr. Wyatt agrees with the assenters that, on an overall basis, the conclusions in this Statement will lead to improvements 
in accounting for an understanding of pension costs.  He believes, however, that the degree of improvements is modest 
when related to the improvement that he believes should have been achieved. Thus in his view the Statement’s deficiencies 
represent a lost opportunity for improvement in financial reporting (page 28) 
 
One can only imagine what Mr. Wyatt would have said had he known that there would be no further changes 
in the measurement of pension expense, or in the balance sheet valuation of net pension liability, for at least 21 years. 
 
CURRENT REGULATIONS AND RECENT FASB ACTIONS 
 
 Regardless of the merits (or lack thereof) of Statement 87, the fact remains that it represents the defining standard 
for the measurement of pension expense to this day.  And until the recent actions by the FASB, it remained as the 
preeminent standard for the recognition of pension-related assets and liabilities.  However, the first phase of the FASB‘s 
current pension project has substantively altered this latter fact.  While this change might be criticized as being overdue, it 
possibly foretells a future with additional substantive changes to the remaining artifacts of SFAS No. 87.  The evolution, 
after such a lengthy impasse, has clearly come back to life, and could possibly be nearing its conclusion.  
 
Statement No. 158  
 
On September 29
th
, 2006, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of Financial 
Accounting No. 158, entitled ―Employers‘ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans‖.  
The provisions of this statement represent a significant improvement in the accounting for defined benefit pension 
plans.  The new standard improves current pension accounting by requiring employers to report the overfunded or 
underfunded status of their defined benefit pension plans as either an asset or liability within the main body of their 
balance sheet.  The fact that meeting such a basic expectation as reporting the plan‘s funded status is viewed as a 
significant advance in pension accounting reveals the lack of progress that had been made in this evolution.  Until the 
enactment of this standard, the funded status of defined benefit plans was only required to be disclosed within the 
firm‘s footnotes to the financial statements.  The mandatory reporting of the net funded status will substantially 
increase the transparency of defined benefit pension accounting and will enhance the usefulness and understandability 
of the reported information.  But perhaps more importantly, the simple fact that the FASB was willing to venture 
beyond the safe confines of a disclosure-only mindset seemingly implies a willingness by FASB to touch what has for 
too long become a metaphorical third rail.  The apparent change in mindset is encouraging for those who believe that 
it is time for the pension ―evolution‖ to yet again focus on financial statement accuracy as the primary goal of pension 
accounting.  While it may be likely that the FASB will attempt to mitigate some of the more negative outcomes 
associated with a too zealous change in the measurement of pension current pension expense, there is reason to 
believe that the profession might finally be contemplating making substantive improvements in the measurement 
techniques that have been 21 years in the waiting. 
 
The Use Of The Projected Benefit Obligation In Measuring The Net Funded Position 
 
The primary new requirement provided by SFAS No. 158 is for firms to report the net funded status of the 
pension plan within the main body of the balance sheet.  The net funded status of the plan will be measured by 
comparing the plan‘s projected benefit obligation to the fair market value of the plan assets.  If a firm‘s net funded 
status is a liability, this net amount will be equal to the unfunded projected benefit obligation.  While SFAS No. 87 
required that there be a minimum pension liability reported for any underfunded pension plan, SFAS No. 158‘s 
requirement to use the projected benefit obligation is a substantial step forward as it is based on what most 
accountants (and FASB) believe is the most accurate measure of the pension obligation.  The previous value mandated 
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by SFAS No. 87 was based on the accumulated benefit obligation.  The accumulated benefit obligation does not 
include the effects of future anticipated pay raises and thus can be argued as being understated.  It should be noted that 
the FASB accomplished this recent improvement without altering any of the main measurement techniques from 
SFAS No. 87.  In effect, they mandated the reporting of the net funded status of pension plans, but left intact the 
various measurement techniques that were introduced by SFAS No. 87.  The changes in the reported net funded status 
are accomplished via changes in comprehensive income. The most likely perceived deficiency in this approach is that 
it could be criticized for leaving pension expense unaltered. 
 
Measurement Dates 
 
SFAS No. 158 also stipulates that the defined benefit plan‘s assets and obligations that determine a plan‘s 
funded status be measured as of the end of the employer‘s fiscal year.  Previously, such measurements were allowed 
within a span of time that could precede the employer‘s fiscal year by as much as three months.  This provision 
enhances the usefulness of the reported measures by improving the timeliness of the underlying measures.  A limited 
exception to this requirement is allowed for plans that are sponsored by either a subsidiary or an investee.  In these 
latter cases, the fiscal year of the subsidiary or investee can instead be used. 
 
Comprehensive Income 
 
The third major requirement of FAS 158 requires that changes in the funded status of defined benefit plans 
be reported in comprehensive income in the year in which the changes occur.  Previously, the net overall effect 
resulting from changes in a plan‘s funded status could only be ascertained by reviewing the reconciliations provided 
within the firm‘s footnotes. 
 
Effective Dates 
 
The effective dates of FAS 158‘s requirements occur in three stages.  The requirement to recognize the 
funded status of the plan becomes effective on December 15, 2006 for entities with publicly traded equity securities.  
For firms without publicly traded equity securities, this recognition requirement becomes effective as of June 15, 
2007.  The requirement to measure the plan‘s assets and obligations as of the date of the employer‘s fiscal year-end, 
becomes effective as of December 15, 2008. 
 
Affected Statements 
 
FAS 158 amends Statement 87, ―Employers‘ Accounting for Pensions‖ ; Statement 88, ―Employers‘ 
Accounting for Settlements and Curtailments of Defined Benefit Pension Plans and for Termination Benefits‖; 
Statement 106, ―Employers Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions‖,  and Statement 132, 
―Employers‘ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits‖. 
 
POTENTIAL AREAS OF EXAMINATION IN THE SECOND PHASE 
 
Statement No. 158 marked the culmination of the first phase of FASB‘s intended multi-phase approach to 
improve the accounting for defined benefit pension and other postretirement plans.  The statement can be seen as 
representing a substantive change in both the actual accounting for pensions and the underlying mindset used by 
FASB.  The importance of FASB‘s departure from disclosure-only pension standards cannot be overstated.  As 
emphasized by FASB itself, disclosure alone cannot resolve the problems inherent in pension accounting.  However, it 
cannot be overlooked that Phase I avoided the contentious issues related to the various mechanics used to actually 
measure pension expense.  Their decision to have periodic changes in net pension assets and/or liabilities reflected in 
comprehensive income is at once, both laudable and clever.  It is laudable because it unquestionably represents a 
substantive improvement in pension accounting.  It is clever because it avoided the truly contentious issue of altering 
the measurement of pension expense. 
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The range of possibilities that could ensue from the next phase of the FASB‘s pension project is extremely 
broad.  The outcome could possibly range from modest changes in current measurement assumptions to truly 
watershed changes in pension accounting.  At a minimum, the next phase will likely examine issues such as the 
complex smoothing and amortization processes that still remain as artifacts of SFAS No. 87.  Many of these processes 
represent the compromises made in the days when accounting regulators were still attempting to wean companies 
from the far weaker requirements of APB Opinion No. 8.  The mindset at that time was different from that currently 
being displayed by the FASB.  Accordingly, the forthcoming deliberations will likely involve issues such as the 
deferral processes used for prior service cost, market volatility, and changes resulting from actuarial corrections. 
Additionally, it is likely that FASB will at least consider offering additional guidance for the many actuarial 
assumptions that are part of the current pension measurement procedures.  As the balance sheet valuations improve, 
the variability that ensues from this actuarial latitude will likely become more noticeable and thus more important. 
 
The Preparer Orientation Of SFAS No. 87 
 
The enactment of SFAS No. 87 in 1986 was, at the time, intended to be little more than an incremental step 
in a longer evolutionary process.  Since SFAS 87 was not intended to be a final statement on pensions, it was by its 
very nature a compromise.  Accordingly, the deliberations that occurred during the development of that standard were 
relatively unique.  Instead of seeking a final end product, FASB was seeking a standard that provided incremental 
improvement.  Due to this environment, FASB was unusually receptive to the desires held by preparers when 
establishing key provisions of the Standard.  Accordingly, the key to understanding the provisions of SFAS No. 87 is 
to adopt the perspective of the preparer, not the user.  If this perspective is adopted, the complexities and compromises 
of the statement become surprisingly rational and understandable.  Most of the complicated measurement mechanisms 
of SFAS No. 87 are rooted in nothing more mysterious than a natural desire by corporations to mitigate the standard‘s 
effect on their resulting financial statements.  Stated more directly, pension sponsoring corporations sought to lessen 
pension-related expense and liability wherever possible.  While the accounting profession may be hesitant to admit 
that it created a standard that favored the interests of the preparer over those of the user, when viewed from a long 
term perspective, this compromise was surely well-intended and arguably wise. 
 
The importance of SFAS No. 87 to the current discussion of SFAS No. 158 is due to the fact that all of the 
measurement techniques prescribed within SFAS No. 87 still exist under SFAS 158.  In effect, with SFAS No. 158, 
FASB altered where the numbers are reported without altering how those numbers are derived.  Accordingly, an 
informed analysis of the current pension project requires an understanding of those elements of SFAS 87 that can 
reasonably be expected to come under review during the second phase of the FASB‘s pension project. 
 
Will Prior Service Costs, Market Volatilities, And Actuarial Corrections Continue To Be Amortized? 
 
It should be noted that, at least in theory, FASB could choose to simply discontinue all of the income-
smoothing aspects of SFAS 87 altogether.  As FASB itself noted in SFAS No. 87, one of the most theoretically 
correct measure of pension expense would be based solely on the change in net pension liability: 
 
…it would be conceptually appropriate and preferable to recognize a net pension liability or asset measured as the 
difference between the projected benefit obligation and plan assets, either with no delay in recognition of gains and 
losses, or perhaps with gains or losses reported in comprehensive income but not in earnings. (paragraph 107, SFAS 
No. 87) 
 
If, in the unlikely chance FASB chose to no longer have any ―delay in recognition of gains and losses,‖ they 
would effectively eliminate all the complex mechanisms created by SFAS No. 87 that serve to defer and smooth these 
various pension-related items.  If the FASB decided to take this route, pension expense would ultimately be very 
similar (or identical) to the pension-related component contained in comprehensive income as mandated by SFAS No. 
158.  However, it seems highly unlikely that FASB will choose to ignore the arguments previously espoused by 
preparers regarding their need to defer prior service cost or to defer and amortize the effects of market volatility. 
Interestingly, the FASB addressed the possible future outcomes by warning that there should be no conclusions drawn 
from the mere existence of a second stage: 
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The Board expects to readdress in the second phase of the project many issues that were initially addressed in 
Statements 87 and 106… However, the Board’s commitment to readdress those issues and the issues raised by 
respondents to [SFAS No. 158’s] Exposure Draft should not be viewed as a conclusion that the present measurements 
of defined benefit postretirement obligations are inappropriate or will change. (SFAS No. 158, paragraph B27) 
 
While it appeared as though the FASB was merely warning against prejudging the process, they were more 
likely demanding their freedom to choose among any potential outcome, including the possibility of making no further 
changes at all.  However, given the fact that this potential outcome was explicitly mentioned, the FASB may have 
ironically heightened prejudgment rather than mitigate it, by making many readers suspect that an outcome of no 
changes is now a likely outcome. 
 
Given this set of circumstances, it is probable that FASB is not likely to end the deferral and smoothing 
mechanisms from SFAS 87.  Instead, FASB is much more likely to consider altering these mechanisms in order to 
further improve their results.  Accordingly, an understanding of how SFAS 87 defers and amortizes these various 
gains and losses will help facilitate an understanding of the likely deliberations that will occur in FASB‘s second stage 
of their pension-related process.   
 
Primary Categories Of Deferrals 
 
There are several elements of SFAS No. 87 that can effectively serve to defer the recognition of pension 
expense.  The three major objectives for allowing these deferrals were to: 1) smooth the effect of valuation changes of 
pension assets due to market fluctuations, 2) smooth the effect of valuation changes of pension obligations due to 
actuarial changes, and 3) amortize the effect of newly encountered prior service costs due to pension plan adjustments.  
The extent to which pension expense is deferred depends, in turn, upon the various thresholds and estimates used 
during the measurement process.  Accordingly, any future examination of these smoothing and deferring techniques is 
likely to be accompanied by an examination of the associated actuarial estimates and assumptions. 
 
The Deferral Of Market Volatility 
 
To smooth the effect that market volatility might have on the resulting measure of pension expense, SFAS 
No. 87 replaces the actual return on plan assets with a firm-derived expected return.  Since the amount earned by plan 
assets helps defray the cost of future pension benefits, these returns reduce pension expense.  However, since the stock 
market is extremely volatile, a direct recognition of this fact could make the resulting pension expense relatively 
volatile.  Quite naturally, firms have a strong distaste for income volatility and would prefer that this linkage between 
market returns and reported income be subjugated to a smoothing process.  SFAS No. 87 satisfied this preference by 
providing complex mechanisms that, in effect, replace the use of actual returns with expected returns.  The differences 
between the actual returns and the expected returns are deferred for possible future amortization.  These differences 
are referred to as ‗asset‘ gains or losses because they are associated with the pension plan assets.  To determine 
whether these deferred ‗excess‘ returns and/or losses are amortized, they must be: 1) accumulated with the asset 
deferrals from other periods, 2) added to similar deferrals resulting from unexpected actuarial changes in the value of 
pension obligations, and 3) compared to a threshold consisting of the larger of 10 percent of the plan‘s ‗market related 
value‘ or 10 percent of the ―projected benefit obligation‖. 
 
This resulting smoothing mechanism is so complex that it frequently cannot be understood by even 
accountants unless they first learn the specific vernacular of pension accounting.  For this particular aspect of SFAS 
No. 87, an understanding of the terms ―market related value‖ and ―projected benefit obligation‖ serves as the 
necessary vernacular prerequisite.  The market related value of the pension plan assets is an average of up to five years 
of pension plan market values.  The projected benefit obligation of a pension plan is an actuarial valuation of the 
obligation that includes the effect of future estimated pay raises.  Only if the accumulated net gain or loss resulting 
from both market fluctuations and actuarial adjustments exceeds 10 percent of the larger of the market related asset 
value or projected benefit obligation, is the excess then subject to recognition via amortization.  The amount that 
would be amortized is determined by dividing this excess by the average remaining service life of your workforce.  
For example, if the accumulated net deferred amount was a loss of $1,000,000 and the values for the market related 
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asset value and projected benefit obligation were $700,000 and $800,000 respectively, the excess would be $200,000.  
If the average remaining service life of the workforce was 20 years, the amount of the $1,000,000 deferred loss that 
would be recognized as a part of pension expense would be equal to $200,000 divided by 20, or $10,000.  The key 
issue in this analysis is the conceptual tradeoff between the benefits derived from avoiding income volatility versus 
the negative effect of having pension expense based on a measure that differs from what was actually experienced.  In 
turn, two of the key factors within this issue are: 1) the magnitude of the unrecognized deferrals, and 2) the latitude 
that preparers have in selecting some of the critical assumptions used in the process.  Accordingly, the future pension 
debate will likely include deliberation of these two aforementioned factors.  If it is determined that the unrecognized 
deferrals are too large, the FASB will likely adjust the thresholds and factors that determine how much expense is 
deferred and how it is ultimately amortized.  Similarly, if the FASB determines that there is too much latitude in the 
selection of actuarial estimates and assumptions, they will likely examine the guidance in this area in an attempt to 
enhance the resulting uniformity, comparability, and usefulness of the resulting pension data. 
 
Net Pension Liability Deferral 
 
As was previously mentioned, deferred pension-related gains and losses are derived from different sources.  
The primary sources include: 1) the deferral of unexpected gains and losses resulting from market volatility, 2) the 
deferral of actuarial corrections, and 3) the deferral of prior service cost.  The deferral of actuarial corrections is a 
byproduct resulting from the great number of assumptions that are required to estimate the pension obligation.  These 
assumptions include estimates of inflation rates, salary increases, retiree mortality, and returns on pension plan assets.  
Obviously, these estimates and assumptions will change over time, affecting, in turn, the resulting estimates of the 
pension liabilities.  The treatment of the resulting change in liability is similar to that used for market volatility.  The 
resulting gains or losses are deferred and accumulated with the other deferrals.  This accumulated deferred gain or loss 
is then compared to the previously discussed threshold to determine if any of it is recognized as a component of future 
measures of current pension expense.  As was previously noted, a related area of possible examination would be the 
guidance that is available for the selection of these various estimates and assumptions.  The latitude in the selection of 
actuarial assumptions could be seen as an important source of variation, possible lessening the comparability and 
resulting usefulness of pension date.  This would be especially true when inter-company comparisons and analyses are 
made.  Accordingly, it seems probable that the overall area of deferred liability gains and losses is one of the areas that 
are likely to be discussed during the FASB‘s second phase of their pension project. 
 
Prior Service Cost Amortization 
 
The deferral and amortization of prior service cost is probably one of the most interesting aspects of pension 
cost accounting.  Prior service cost arises from the granting of credit for employees‘ prior service whenever the 
underlying pension formulation is changed.  Let‘s presume, for example, that an employee has ten years of service and 
was covered by a pension plan that based annual retirement benefits on the following formula: (years of service x 1% 
x ending annual salary).  If the pension plan was altered to increase benefits, there would be an immediate obligation 
to the employee for his or her prior years of service.  For example, if the formula was ―sweetened‖ by increasing the 
percentage from 1% to 1.5%, there would be an immediate 50% increase accrued pension obligation to this employee 
for his or her prior 10 years of service. 
 
Logical arguments can be made for deferring and amortizing this increment.  However, these logical 
arguments are more strongly based on notions of fair play and desired economic outcomes, rather than accounting 
theory.  Since the increase in prior service cost immediately occurs when the plan is altered, and it is not dependent 
upon any additional service by the employee, the most natural accounting interpretation of this transaction would be 
for it to be immediately recognized as an expense.  However, a requirement mandating immediate expensing seems 
contrary to notions of fair play, and would seemingly discourage employers from undertaking actions that society 
would generally deem to be desirable.  The notion of fair play comes into being when you view the transaction from 
the perspective of the employer.  While the employees are not legally obligated to provide any future service to entitle 
them to the payment of this prior service cost, the employer would not logically have incurred this cost without the 
expectation of future service from the employees.  So, while the legal interpretation of this transaction may indicate 
that prior service cost is an expense, a more ‗common-sensible‘ interpretation implies that the employer only incurred 
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the cost because of the expectation of future services from their workers.  Additionally, forcing firms to record the 
cost as an immediate expense would surely serve as a disincentive for granting such pension enhancements in the 
future.  Accordingly, these factors might have understandably persuaded the accounting profession to be relatively 
sympathetic to any justifications that employers could offer to legitimize this deferral.  Arguably, the methods 
ultimately chosen to defer and amortize these costs were indeed affected by these non-accounting factors since a 
dispassionate interpretation of the transaction would have disallowed the current treatment of prior service cost 
deferral. And perhaps even more revealing is the treatment that is accorded to prior service cost when a plan is 
deemed to be underfunded.  When a sponsoring firm has an unfunded accumulated benefit obligation, the firm is 
required to recognize additional liability, but is allowed to offset it with an equal intangible asset.  In these latter 
instances, the prior service cost is explicitly recognized as having purchased an asset, even though there is no legal 
requirement for the employees to provide any additional service to the firm.  The deferral and resulting treatment of 
prior service cost is probably one of the most likely areas that will be examined by the FASB during their forthcoming 
second stage of their project. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The issuance of SFAS No. 158 by the FASB represents the culmination of the first stage of their planned two 
stage project on pensions.  The results of this first stage are promising in that FASB ventured beyond the confines of 
the disclosure-only standards that they have issued since the enactment of SFAS No. 87 in 1985.  Interestingly, if the 
goal of the accounting profession were to simply promulgate theoretically correct pension standards, this issue would 
likely have been resolved at least 40 years ago.  However, the topic of pensions is complicated by the interaction of 
historical precedence and the fear of negative economic consequences.  Accordingly, the profession long ago sought 
to resolve the pension dilemma via an evolutionary process whereby each subsequent standard would push the 
profession incrementally toward the ultimate goal of fully accrued measures of pension expense and liability.  
However, human nature predictably intervened in this planned process, causing a twenty-one year stall in the 
evolution.  SFAS No. 158 has restarted this evolution with their two stage pension project.  The first stage provides 
important changes that push the process very close to the long sought goal of fully accrued measures of pension 
expense and net liability.  The largest remaining area of focus relates to the actual measure of current pension expense.  
SFAS No. 158 avoided this controversial aspect of the topic by limiting their income-related changes to 
comprehensive income.  Accordingly, the remaining possibilities for future FASB deliberation include the 
measurement of pension expense and the related mechanisms leftover from SFAS No. 87 used to calculate this 
measure. 
 
The fact that FASB accomplished so much in one step, and did so without altering the contentious 
measurement techniques from SFAS No. 87, is exceedingly clever and commendable.  There is little question that the 
evolution has taken its next step with SFAS No. 158.  Even if no further changes were to be made (which FASB noted 
as a possibility), the resulting improvements of SFAS No. 158 are significant.  The accounting profession and the 
business world eagerly await the outcome of ―Phase II‖. 
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